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Introduction
Webster's New College Dictionary defines quotation marks as punc-
tuation marks "used chiefly to indicate the beginning and the end of a
quotation in which the exact phraseology of another or of a text is di-
rectly cited."' When quotation marks are used, the reader automatically
attributes the exact words within the quotation marks to the person
cited. The reader believes that the quotation marks represent that the
author is accurately conveying language used by another without para-
phrasing or fabricating. The reader is on guard when quotation marks
are lacking that the author may have paraphrased the exact wording or
inserted his own rendition of the statement. However, the reader lowers
his guard at the sight of quotation marks and believes that the exact lan-
guage must have been used or the author could not have placed quota-
tion marks around the words. This is the meaning of quotation marks
that we have all learned since grammar school. As will be shown, this is
the meaning that the journalism profession also attributes to quotation
marks.
The Ninth Circuit recently attempted to redefine the meaning of the
quotation mark in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine.2 In Masson, Jeffrey
Masson, a public figure, contended that the defendants libeled him and
placed him in a false light by fabricating words attributed to him within
quotation marks.' The court held:
Malice will not be inferred from evidence showing that quoted lan-
guage does not contain the exact words used by the plaintiff provided
that the fabricated quotations are either 'rational interpretations' of
ambiguous remarks made by the public figure .... or do not 'alter the
substantive content' of unambiguous remarks actually made by the
public figure .... '
The United States Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's test of
rational interpretation and substituted its own test of material alteration.'
However, the United States Supreme Court's test fails to go far enough
to adequately protect speakers and the true meaning of quotation marks.
The media should be forced to respect the true meaning of the quo-
tation mark. Malice should be inferred from evidence showing that the
media deliberately altered quotations even if the quotations are rational
interpretations of or do not alter the substantive content of the actual
statements. If the media has knowledge that a fabricated quotation is
false, publishing it shows a knowledge of falsity or actual malice.
1. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 942 (1981) (emphasis added).
2. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
3. Id. at 1536.
4. Id. at 1539 (citations omitted).
5. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, !11 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (1991).
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Whether or not the misquoted language is defamatory, a cause of action
against the media should be permitted if the language attributed to a
particular person is materially different from what that person actually
said. This article discusses the need to protect the meaning of the quota-
tion mark.
Part I discusses the background cases regarding the right to mis-
quote. Part II discusses the majority and dissenting opinions of the
Ninth Circuit decision in Masson. Part III recommends a different ap-
proach to handling cases in which the media has misquoted a party. Part
IV analyzes the United States Supreme Court decision in Masson.6 Part
V discusses the possible causes of action a misquoted party should be
able to seek and the possible remedies that should be awarded for each
cause of action. Part VI discusses hypothetical situations in which a re-
porter has misquoted a person and suggests how the court should handle
these situations. Finally, this article concludes that the media must abide
by the dictionary definition of the quotation mark or the public must be
put on notice that the meaning of the quotation mark has changed and
that it does not necessarily mean that those exact words were used.
I
Background
The next section describes cases that involved issues similar to those
involved in Masson. The cases are grouped by level of court, beginning
with the United States Supreme Court, then the federal circuit courts of
appeal, and finally state courts. The cases provide a background for the
decision in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine.
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions
In New York Times v. Sullivan,7 the United States Supreme Court
extended the constitutional protection of free speech and press to libelous
statements.' The New York Times rule states that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit a public official from recovering damages in
a libel action unless he or she proves that the statement was made with
actual malice.9 The Court did not equate malice with ill will. Instead,
the Court defined actual malice as a statement made either with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was
false.1° This rule applies to public figures as well.'1
6. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. Id. at 279-80.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 280.
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In Time, Inc. v. Pape, 12 the plaintiff sued the publisher for libel for
quoting from a summary of a complaint without indicating that the
charges were not the independent findings of the Commission and for
omitting the word "alleged" in an article about a Commission Report
regarding the case of Monroe v. Pape. I3 The Court held that "Time's
omission of the word 'alleged' amounted to the adoption of one of a
number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled
with ambiguities."' 4 Despite the context of the word in the Commission
Report and the evidence of the Report's overall meaning, the Court
found that the omission of the word "alleged" was not enough to create a
jury issue of actual malice.
15
In Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of U.S., 6 the manufacturer of a
loudspeaker system brought an action against a consumer product test-
ing organization for product disparagement arising out of an article re-
viewing the loudspeakers. The manufacturer objected to statements in
the article about its system, including one stating that the sound of indi-
vidual musical instruments tended to wander "about the room."' 7 The
article contained a false statement of fact because the sound of the instru-
ments tended to wander "along the wall," rather than "about the
room."'
18
The Court found that the only evidence of actual malice was the fact
that the statement was an inaccurate description of what was actually
perceived."' The Court held, "[A]doption of the language chosen was
'one of a number of possible rational interpretations' of an event 'that
bristled with ambiguities' and descriptive challenges for the writer."2 °
The Court held that although the choice of language reflected a miscon-
ception, it was still protected by the First Amendment.2
In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,22 the Court
addressed the issue of the use of professional standards in establishing
malice in a libel action. The newspaper's decision to publish an article
was held to constitute an extreme departure from professional stan-
11. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
12. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 290.
15. Id.
16. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
17. Id. at 485.
18. Id. at 490.
19. Id. at 512.
20. Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971)).
21. Id. at 513.
22. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
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dards.23 However, the Court held that a showing of highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from journalistic standards
could not alone support a sufficient basis for finding actual malice.24 The
Court stated that public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York
Times standard and not by the professional standards rule.25
The Court found that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals con-
cerning the newspaper's extreme departure from professional standards
merely supported the ultimate conclusion that the newspaper acted with
reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.26 Thus, a finding of an extreme
departure from professional standards can be used as support for a find-
ing of New York Times actual malice.
In Garrison v. Louisiana,"2 the Court stated that a calculated false-
hood puts a different cast on the question of constitutionally protected
speech.29 The Court reasoned, "Although honest utterance, even if inac-
curate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does
not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a pub-
lic official, should enjoy a like immunity.""a The Court further stated
that calculated falsehoods are not an essential part of an exposition of
ideas, and "are of such slight social value.., that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality .... ."I' The Court concluded that the knowingly false
statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the
truth are not constitutionally protected. a2
B. Appellate Court Decisions
In Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers,3 the court decided
whether the attribution by a newspaper of the Spanish word "cerdos"
(translated as "pigs") to a comment made by the Mayor of Elizabeth,
New Jersey while describing the City's litter problem constituted libel.
The court found that the New York Times standard must be applied to
the Spanish language used and not to the English translation.3 4 The
court explained, "We proceed in this manner because we believe that a
23. Id. at 664.
24. Id. at 665.
25. Id. at 666.
26. Id. at 667-68.
27. Id. at 668.
28. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
29. Id. at 75.
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
32. Id.
33. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
34. Id. at 452.
19921
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translation may not always reflect the nuances and subtleties of the origi-
nal language. This is especially true in the present case, because it is not
controverted that there is no exact Spanish word for litterer or
litterbug.""a
The court found that "cerdos" was a rational interpretation of am-
biguous remarks.3 6 The court held that because the word "cerdos" must
be evaluated in its unaltered Spanish version and because the word was a
fair translation of the words "litter," "litterer," or "litterbug," it was
critical that the plaintiff "meet this reality with countervailing factual
evidence of actual malice."' 37 Since he failed to do this, the court affirmed
the district court's holding of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. 3
In Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 39 the plaintiff, a writer and lecturer
who was a friend of Ernest Hemingway, sued for libel and invasion of
privacy because of unfavorable remarks made about him in Hemingway
in Spain. The court found, "As originally translated, Hemingway's
words were: '[Hotchner is] dirty and a terrible ass-licker. There's some-
thing phony about him. I wouldn't sleep in the same room with him.' "4"
The author altered the quotation to the words, "I don't trust him."'"
The court held that, "It is true that in transforming the words to the
much milder 'I don't trust him,' Doubleday was fictionalizing to some
extent. However, the change did not increase the defamatory impact or
alter the substantive content of Hemingway's statement about Hotch-
ner. ' The court concluded, "If Doubleday could not have been liable
for publishing the uncut version, it cannot be liable for deciding to make
the passage less offensive to Hotchner.
'43
In Carson v. Allied News Co.," the plaintiffs brought an action seek-
ing compensatory and punitive damages for an allegedly libelous article
that appeared in the National Insider. The article contained supposed
quotations from meetings between Johnny Carson and NBC executives





39. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977).




44. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
45. Id. at 212.
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that he personally had no conversations with the executives regarding the
subject matter in the quotations.46 The court stated:
In the catalogue of responsibilities of journalists, right next to pla-
giarism ... must be a canon that a journalist does not invent quota-
tions and attribute them to actual persons. If a writer can sit down in
the quiet of his cubicle and create conversations ... and dispense this
as news, it is difficult to perceive what First Amendment protection
such fiction can claim. In any event, St. Amant expressly gives as an-
other example of reckless disregard for the truth any "product of
[one's] imagination."47
Because the defendant had printed wholly imagined conversations as di-
rect quotes, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury's
determination on the question of actual malice.48
C. State Court Decisions
In Bindrim v. Mitchell,49 a clinical psychologist who was a public
figure sued the publisher and the author of a novel for libelous statements
contained in the novel. The plaintiff used nude marathon group therapy
to help people shed their psychological inhibitions.50 Defendant, the au-
thor, entered the class as a participant after signing a written contract
that she would not disclose what happened in the sessions.5
The plaintiff asserted that he was libeled by the suggestion that he
used obscene language which he did not in fact use.52 The plaintiff al-
leged that the novel was libelous and that the book contained several
false statements of fact." Plaintiff complained in particular about a
quoted conversation in the novel between the plaintiff and a minister in
which the author portrayed the plaintiff in a disparaging light. 4 The
court held that some of the incidents portrayed by the author were false
and "cast plaintiff in a disparaging light since they portray his language
and conduct as crude, aggressive, and unprofessional." 55
The court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to
support the jury's finding that the author had actual malice and that
Doubleday had actual malice when it permitted the paperback printing
of the novel Touching.56 The author had knowledge of the truth of what
46. Id.
47. Id. at 213 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)).
48. Id.
49. 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App. 1979).
50. Id. at 33.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 35.
53. Id. at 38.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 35.
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transpired at the encounter since she attended the sessions, and "the jury
was entitled to find that her publication was in reckless disregard of that
truth or with actual knowledge of falsity." 7 The court held that the jury
could have inferred that Doubleday acted with actual malice in publish-
ing the novel after receiving a letter from the plaintiff's attorney explain-
ing that the plaintiff was the character in the novel."
In Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 9 Robert Selleck, the father of
actor Tom Selleck, sued Globe International for libel and false light inva-
sion of privacy for publishing an article that contained quotations about
Tom Selleck attributed to the plaintiff. The magazine carried the head-
line, "Tom Selleck's Love Secrets-By His Father."'  The plaintiff al-
leged that he never gave an interview to any of defendant's reporters and
did not consent to any interview that the defendant could use.61 The
plaintiff argued that the quotations in the article were falsely attributed
to him and that the defendant published the statements with knowledge
that they were falsely attributed to him or with reckless disregard of the
fact that he did not make the statements.62
The court found that the content of the article conveyed the impres-
sion that plaintiff granted an interview to defendant and divulged matters
about his son.6a The court noted, "Falsely ascribing statements to a per-
son which would have the same damaging effect as a defamatory state-
ment about him is libel. ' 6 The court held that the article was
reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning and reversed the trial
court's dismissal, holding that the statements were libelous per se.65
In Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner,66 the plaintiff sued the
defendant for libel based on defendant's newspaper column which attrib-
uted a passage to the plaintiff. The column was a review of a television
documentary. 67 The defendant stated in his review, "My impression is
that the executive producer Walt Baker . . . told his writer/producer
.. .'We've got a hot potato here-let's pour on titillating innuendo and as
much bare flesh as we can get away with. Viewers will eat it up!' "68
57. Id. at 36.
58. Id.
59. 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1985).
60. Id. at 841.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 844.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 721 P.2d 87 (Cal. 1986).
67. Id. at 88.
68. Id.
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The court found that the defendant explicitly qualified the disputed
statement by warning the reader that he was giving his impression, and
by doing so, he made it clear that he intended to convey his opinion
about what the plaintiff might have said.69 Further, the court held that
there was no indication in the column that the defendant had interviewed
the plaintiff or his writer/producer and had been told of the remarks.70
The court concluded, "Viewed in the context of the review ... it would
be unreasonable to view the conversation as anything more than the hy-
pothetical, tongue-in-cheek invention it was intended to be."
71
II
The Ninth Circuit Decision in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine
Masson was a case of first impression for both the United States
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit.72
A. Facts
In 1983, Janet Malcolm published a two-part article in The New
Yorker Magazine concerning the termination of psychoanalyst Jeffrey M.
Masson from his position as Projects Director of Sigmund Freud
Archives (Archives).7" The article was largely based upon Malcolm's
tape-recorded interviews with Masson. 74 Masson filed suit against Mal-
colm, The New Yorker Magazine, and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., contending
libel and false light invasion of privacy based on fabricated words attrib-
uted to him within quotation marks and misleadingly edited state-
ments. 75 The original complaint was filed on November 29, 1984.76 On
August 17, 1986, partial summary judgment for defendants was granted
and on August 17, 1987, summary judgment for all defendants was
granted.77 Masson appealed both summary judgments on September 11,
1987.78
69. Id. at 92.
70. Id. at 94.
71. Id. at 95.
72. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1537 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 2419 (1991).
73. Id. at 1536.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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Masson was a full professor of Sanskrit and Indian studies at the
University of Toronto from 1975 to 1980.79 In 1980, he became the
Projects Director of the Archives; however, he was fired in 1981 because
of a disagreement regarding the reality of sexual abuse of children. S°
Malcolm contacted Masson in October of 1982 and asked to interview
him about the controversy. S1 Masson agreed to be interviewed and when
Masson first met Malcolm, "she asked him if she could tape record the
interviews, explaining that it would be to his advantage since it would
mean there would be no misquotations." 2 Masson demonstrated his
concern to Malcolm that he be quoted accurately and Malcolm reassured
him that he need not worry because she would take the quotations verba-
tim from the tapes. 3 Prior to publication, fact checker Nancy Franklin
contacted Masson regarding the article and during their discussion Mas-
son realized that there were errors in the publication.8 4 Franklin noted
the inaccuracies, but the corrections were never made."5 The articles
were published on December 5 and 12, 1983, in The New Yorker Maga-
zine and were later published in book form by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.86
Masson, a public figure, was constitutionally required to prove actual
malice. 7 The court assumed that the quotations were deliberately
altered. 8
B. Majority Opinion
Judge Alarcon, writing for the majority of the court, addressed the
question of whether or not actual malice can be inferred from evidence
showing that a defamatory statement was attributed to a person by using
quotation marks that do not contain his exact words. 9 The court found
that Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers9" stood for the rule that ac-
tual malice would not be inferred if the misquote was a "rational inter-
pretation of remarks that bristled with ambiguities."'" The court read
Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche92 as holding that if the change did not "alter
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 7-8.




90. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
91. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1538.
92. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977).
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the substantive content" of unambiguous remarks actually made by a
public figure, malice would not be inferred.93 The court limited Carson v.
Allied News Co.9 to the rule that "[a] factfinder may infer actual malice
from a fabricated quotation when the language attributed to the plaintiff
is wholly the product of the author's imagination."95 Finally, the court
summarized the finding in Bindrim v. Mitchell 6 by saying that "an au-
thor's privilege to alter quotations is not unlimited."97
The court held that the current law governing the defamatory na-
ture of statements ostensibly ascribed to another person by the use of
quotation marks can be summarized as follows:
A factfinder may infer actual malice from a fabricated quotation when
the language attributed to the plaintiff is wholly the product of the
author's imagination. An author may, however, under certain circum-
stances, fictionalize quotations "to some extent." Malice will not be
inferred from evidence showing that the quoted language does not con-
tain the exact words used by the plaintiff provided that the fabricated
quotations are either "rational interpretations" of ambiguous remarks
made by the public figure, or do not "alter the substantive content" of
unambiguous remarks actually made by the public figure.
98
Masson challenged a number of quotations attributed to him by
Malcolm. For example, Malcolm quoted Masson as stating, "I was like
an intellectual gigolo . . . ,,9 This language was not in the tape-record-
ings from the interview with Masson." The court adopted the District
Court's holding that malice could not be inferred from the purported
fabrication because "intellectual gigolo" was a rational interpretation of
Masson's comments and the "interpretation did not alter the substantive
content of Masson's description of himself as a 'private asset but a public
liability' to Eissler and Anna Freud." ' Further, the court held that "the
'intellectual gigolo' quotation was not defamatory."'0 2 Masson also chal-
lenged other quotations attributed to him including "greatest analyst
who ever lived" and "sex, women, fun."' 0 3 Masson also challenged a
number of misleadingly edited quotations that he contended Malcolm
took out of context."° The court held that malice could not be inferred
93. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1538.
94. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
95. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539.
96. 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App. 1979).
97. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539.
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 1540.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1541.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1542.
104. Id. at 1544.
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from any of the quotations and affirmed summary judgment in favor of
the defendants."15
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Kozinski strongly disagreed with the majority's
new definition of quotation marks. Judge Kozinski stated:
As I see it, when a writer uses quotation marks in reporting what
someone else has said, she is representing that these are the speaker's
own words or something very close to them. The majority views quo-
tations much more amorphously: they are merely an extrapolation of
the speaker's words, as interpreted in light of his background and char-
acter. Under the majority's approach, the resulting "quotation" may
differ significantly in wording and content from what the speaker actu-
ally uttered, so long as the writer can argue with a straight face that it
is a rational interpretation of what the speaker said. 1to6
Judge Kozinski expressed his opinion that "the right to deliberately alter
quotations is not, in my view, a concomitant of a free press." 10 7 He ex-
plained that "[b]ecause quotations purport to come directly from the
speaker-free of editorial comment by the writer-they can have a dev-
astating rhetorical impact and thus carry a serious potential for
harm." 0 8 He went on to point out that "readers give far greater weight
to direct quotations than to descriptions or paraphrases by the au-
thor."'" Thus, he explained:
By putting the phrase into Masson's own mouth and concealing her
role as inteipreter and editor, Malcolm has caused Masson a serious
injury and made it look like a self-inflicted wound. It is this conceal-
ment-the use of quotation marks to deceive the reader about the au-
thor's editorial role-that libel law prohibits and the Constitution does
not, in my opinion, protect." 10
Judge Kozinski argued that the cases the majority cited do not sup-
port the legal theory that it put forth. He stated that Dunn"' did not
hold that malice could not be inferred from misquoting but merely that,
due to the difficulties involved in translating a speech from English to
Spanish, the plaintiff would have to introduce more evidence of malice.
These problems did not exist in the present case."
2
Judge Kozinski also disagreed with the majority's reading of Hotch-
ner. 13 He argued that the case did not stand for the proposition that a
105. Id. at 1546, 1548.
106. Id. at 1548 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1559.
109. Id. at 1549.
110. Id. at 1550.
111. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
112. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1555.
113. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977).
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writer may alter quotes, but only that the plaintiff could not base a claim
on changes in a quote if the changes did not increase the defamatory
impact of the quote."1 4 He found that Carson" 5 actually conflicts with
the majority's opinion and that the Carson court gave journalists a stern
admonition against "invent[ing] quotations and attribut[ing] them to ac-
tual persons. '""I6 Judge Kozinski pointed out that in the journalistic pro-
fession "[t]he fundamental rule, widely accepted, is that '[q]uotation
marks mean literally that the words they enclose are exactly as the
source gave them-verbatim.' "117
Judge Kozinski then set out a five step test to resolve a case in which
misquoting has allegedly occurred. The test is:
1. Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition of
what the speaker said?
2. If so, is it inaccurate?
3. If so, is the inaccuracy material?
4. If so, is the inaccuracy defamatory?
5. If so, is the inaccuracy a result of malice, i.e., is it a fabrication or
was it committed in reckless disregard of the truth?""
He stated that if the answer to any of the questions is no, then the de-
fendant wins, but if all are answered yes, the matter goes to the jury." l9
Judge Kozinski concluded, "To invoke the right to deliberately dis-
tort what someone else has said is to assert the right to lie in print."'120
He opined that The New Yorker's assertion "debases the journalistic pro-
fession as a whole."'
121
III
Criticism of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine
The court in Masson misapplied the prior case law in this area, ig-
nored journalistic professional standards, chilled free speech instead of
protecting it, and failed to consider the technological advances of today's
society.
A. Inappropriate Reading of Prior Case Law
The Masson majority narrowly characterized the holding in Carson
v. Allied News Co. The majority unnecessarily construed the holding to
114. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1556.
115. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
116. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1556.
117. Id. at 1558 (quoting MITCHELL V. CHARNLEY & BLAIR CHARNLEY, REPORTING 248
(4th ed. 1979)).
118. Id. at 1562.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1570.
121. Id.
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require that the language attributed to a public figure must be wholly the
product of the author's imagination in order for a public figure to recover
for libel based on invented quotations.' 22 In Carson, the Seventh Circuit
stated that journalists must have the responsibility to not invent quota-
tions and attribute them to actual persons. 123 The court found it difficult
to perceive what protection the First Amendment gave to invented quo-
tations. 124 The court did not limit its holding to wholly imagined quota-
tions. The court concluded that the newspaper "in fabricating and
imagining 'facts' necessarily entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
the statements and had a high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity."'
125
Of all the relevant cases, Carson presents the closest analogy to Mas-
son. The two different conclusions cannot be reconciled. In Masson,
Malcolm invented quotations and attributed them to Masson after an
actual interview. No conversation actually took place in Carson and the
quotations were wholly imagined, but they were no more imagined than
the quotes in Masson. The fact that Malcolm actually interviewed Mas-
son should not immunize her from liability for fabricating quotations.
The important facts in Carson were that the newspaper invented quota-
tions and attributed them to a public figure. This is exactly what oc-
curred in Masson.
The majority in Masson could also have followed the holding in Sel-
leck. In Selleck, the court found that the defendant falsely attributed
quotations to the plaintiff and that the defendant's action of publishing
the quotations with knowledge that they were not made by the plaintiff
constituted actual malice. 126 Again, this is exactly what occurred in
Masson. Malcolm falsely attributed quotations to Masson with knowl-
edge that Masson did not make those statements. This fits neatly into the
definition of actual malice. The fact that the statements were supposedly
rational interpretations does not change the fact that Malcolm had
knowledge that Masson did not actually make those particular state-
ments which Malcolm placed within quotation marks.
The majority in Masson misinterpreted the holding in Dunn. The
focus in Dunn was the problem of translating from English to Spanish.
The Third Circuit held that the use of the word "cerdos" was a "rational
interpretation of remarks that bristled with ambiguities."' 27 The court
122. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
123. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Selleck v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 844 (Ct. App. 1985).
127. Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 1987).
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evaluated the word in its unaltered Spanish form and found that the
word was a "fair, albeit inadequate translation" of the word litterer.128
The court reasoned that in light of the court's evaluation, the plaintiff
had to present "countervailing factual evidence of actual malice." '129
Masson can easily be distinguished from Dunn. The problem of
translating from one language to another did not exist in Masson. Eng-
lish was the only language used in the interview and in the articles.
Thus, the defendants in Masson could not claim that any translation was
a rational interpretation of words actually used by Masson. The majority
took the phrase "rational interpretation of remarks that bristled with am-
biguities" entirely out of context and conveniently ignored the facts in
Dunn.
Time, Inc. v. Pape does not support the Ninth Circuit decision in
Masson. In Time, the court held that the "magazine's omission of the
word 'alleged' amounted to the adoption of one of several interpretations
of a document bristling with ambiguities," and that it might have been a
misconception, but it was not enough to establish malice.130 Time in-
volved an omission, while Masson involved the invention of quotations.
Although the omission in Time may have created a misconception, it is
different from inventing quotations. Thus, Time does not support the
majority's holding.
Further, Bose Corp. does not support the majority's holding that
misquotations that are rational interpretations are protected. In Bose,
the respondent published an article containing a false statement that in-
struments heard through speakers tended to wander "about the room,"
when they actually tended to wander "along the wall."'13 1 The court held
that the "adoption of the language chosen was 'one of a number of possi-
ble rational interpretations' of an event 'that bristled with ambiguities'
and descriptive challenges for the writer." 132 Bose Corp. involved an in-
accurate description of perception. This problem of accurately describ-
ing what was perceived was not involved in Masson. The defendants in
Masson were not faced with descriptive challenges when they misquoted
Masson. Creating quotations is different from describing sound systems.
Thus, the holding in Bose does not support the majority's holding.
The majority in Masson misread the two-part holding in Hotchner.
In Hotchner, the court stated that Doubleday's transformation of Hem-
ingway's words to milder words "did not increase the defamatory impact
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971).
131. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 490 (1985).
132. Id. at 512.
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or alter the substantive content of Hemingway's statement about Hotch-
ner."' 33 The court held further that Doubleday could not be liable for
making "the passage less offensive." '134
The majority in Masson failed to mention part one of the holding
and concluded that part two stands alone as a means of excusing the
fabrication of quotations. However, the transformation of words in Mas-
son did increase the defamatory impact of the actual words and was
much more offensive to Masson. For example, Malcolm attributed the
quotation to Masson that he was an "intellectual gigolo." This increased
the defamatory impact of his own statement and was more offensive than
his own statement that he was a "private asset but a public liability" to
Eissler and Anna Freud. It is only necessary to prove that the alteration
increased the defamatory impact when the plaintiff is suing for
defamation.
Further, unlike the qualified statement in Baker, where the author
stated that it was his impression that a conversation probably took place
and invented quotations that he believed were probably stated,13 Mal-
colm's article contained no qualifiers or warnings that Malcolm was giv-
ing her own impression or opinion of Masson. Malcolm used quotations
as a tool to convey the impression that no editorializing was done and
that Masson actually said those words.
In conclusion, the case law conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's major-
ity decision in Masson and supports the reasoning expressed by the dis-
senting opinion. By picking and choosing language from previous cases
that, when taken out of context, can be stretched to support the major-
ity's view, the Ninth Circuit reached a result that is highly suspect.
B. Journalistic Professional Standards
The majority in Masson disregarded the standards of the journalism
profession. In the profession, quotation marks are used to enclose the
exact words given by a source. The widely accepted definition of quota-
tion marks within the profession is that they "mean literally that the
words they enclose are exactly as the source gave them-verbatim." '136
Quotation marks are used "[t]o surround the exact words of a speaker or
writer when reported in a story."' 37 Further, "[m]ost of the newspaper
133. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1977).
134. Id.
135. Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 721 P.2d 87, 89 (Cal. 1986).
136. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1474 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, III S.
Ct. 2419 (1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting MITCHELL V. CHARNLEY & BLAIR CHAR-
NLEY, REPORTING 248 (4th ed. 1979)).
137. Id. (quoting THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL 183 (Chris-
topher W. French et al. eds., 1982)).
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codes or canons tend to stress literal accuracy when quoting news
sources."1
38
The Masson decision has "sparked a debate among members of the
media about the proper use of quotations and has some commentators
speculating that the decision provides the media with a constitutional
right to lie."' 39 The majority in Masson is essentially telling the media
that their standards are too high and that the definition of quotation
marks is not as rigid as the media have expressed in their codes and
canons. Before the majority in Masson attempted to change the defini-
tion of quotation marks, they should have considered the media's own
definition and held the defendants to it.
C. Chilling Free Speech
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."1 "° The First Amend-
ment protects free debate and free exchange of ideas so that society can
be enlightened and can reach the best solution to problems. The United
States Supreme Court has not interpreted this clause to mean that free-
dom of speech is an absolute right.14' The Constitution should not pro-
tect the use of altered quotations because they are unnecessary to free
debate and result in harm to individuals wrongly attributed with words
that defame them.
Extending First Amendment protection to altered quotations will
have the opposite effect from that desired by the majority in Masson. By
holding that the media has the right to alter quotations attributed to an-
other person, the majority chills free speech. Public figures will think
twice before granting interviews on matters of public importance out of
fear that the media will distort their words and portray them in a defam-
atory manner.
138. Id. (quoting JOHN L. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS
OF THE NEWS MEDIA 70 (1976)).
139. Scott C. Herlihy, Comment, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine: Actual Malice and
Direct Quotations-The Constitutional Right to Lie, 65 NOTRE DAME LREv. 564 (1990) (cit-
ing James Warren, To Tell the Truth; Has the Court Given Journalists a Right to Lie?, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 30, 1989, at Cl ("To invoke the right to deliberately distort what someone else has
said is to assert the right to lie in print."); William A. Henry III, The Right to Fake Quotes: A
Journalist's Legal Victory Raises Questions About Ethics, TIME, Aug. 21, 1989, at 49 (quoting
Bill Monroe, editor for the Washington Journalism Review: "I don't see how any journalist
can be happy with a judge condoning tampering with specific quotes.")).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
141. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
716 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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Mountain States Legal Foundation expressed this fear in their ami-
cus curiae brief to the Ninth Circuit.142 They stated that "public figures
will not talk to the media for fear of being the victims of fabricated quo-
tations."' 43 They further stated that "[i]t is hard to imagine what could
have a greater 'chilling' effect on free speech by a public figure than the
fear of fabricated quotations.""'
This view is shared by other writers and has been raised in many
criticisms of the Ninth Circuit's holding. One author stated, "To hold
writers to a 'rational interpretation' standard for direct quotation may
cause public officials and public figures to avoid making statements and
giving interviews, thereby effectively chilling the robust, uninhibited de-
bate that the [F]irst [A]mendment is designed to protect."' 4
Thus, the policy at the heart of the First Amendment will not be
furthered by the Masson decision; instead the valued liberty of free
speech and debate will be inhibited.
D. Technological Advances
It is difficult to understand how the court in Masson can permit the
media to misquote considering the technological advances available to
the media to verify the accuracy of quotations. In Masson, Malcolm
taped the interview with Masson and had the ability to play back Mas-
son's exact statements and accurately quote him. Misquoting under
these circumstances is even more inexcusable than misquoting when the
exact words were not preserved.
According to one author, "[b]road brush protection for journalists
using direct quotations is not necessary in the current age of television
and videotape and audiotape recording."' 46 He further stated that "with
only pen and paper at their disposal, immaterial inaccuracy by reporters
in the past was arguably more understandable."' 47
Advancements in technology have made accurate recording of quo-
tations easier.'48 These advancements make defamatory misquoting by
the press more reprehensible and less deserving of First Amendment
protection.
142. Brief Amicus Curiae In Support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion
of Appropriateness of Rehearing En Banc at 8, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d
1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-2700).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Herlihy, supra note 139, at 584.
146. Id. at 579.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 580.
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IV
United States Supreme Court Decision
A. Holding
The Supreme Court majority in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine
cautioned that the New York Times actual malice definition of knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not should not
be confused with the concept of malice as ill will or spite. 149 The Court
stated that quotation marks indicate that the speaker's words are used
verbatim and rejected the theory that authors could deliberately alter
quotations so long as the quote contained a rational interpretation of the
speaker's words.15° The Court found, "Application of our protection for
rational interpretation in this context finds no support in general princi-
ples of defamation law or in our First Amendment jurisprudence."'1 51
The Court stated that: "The Court of Appeals, however, went one step
beyond protection of quotations that convey the meaning of a speaker's
statement with substantial accuracy and concluded that an altered quota-
tion is protected so long as it is a 'rational interpretation' of an actual
statement ....,,152
The Court also rejected the view that any alteration beyond correc-
tion of grammar or syntax by itself proves knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard for truth.153 The Court reasoned that any alteration of a
verbatim quotation is false in a sense, but not every alteration constitutes
the required actual malice or knowledge of falsity under First Amend-
ment principles.154 The petitioner conceded that minor changes to cor-
rect for grammar or syntax do not amount to falsity for purposes of
proving actual malice. 155
The Court concluded that a test of material change in meaning
should be applied. The Court held that "a deliberate alteration of the
words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity for
purposes of New York Times v. Sullivan ... unless the alteration results
in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement."'' 56
The Court seemed to be influenced in its decision by practical neces-
sity and the impossibility of complete accuracy when reconstructing
149. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, II1 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (1991) (citing Greenbelt
Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).
150. Id. at 2433.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2431-32.
154. Id. at 2431.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2433.
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speaker's words. 5 ' The Court remanded the case to determine if the
alterations constituted libel under the standards set out in the opinion. 1
58
B. Dissent
Justice White, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. Justice White principally disagreed with the majority's
holding that a deliberate alteration does not constitute knowledge of fal-
sity unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning of
the statement.159 According to Justice White, "[T]he reporter, Malcolm,
wrote that Masson said certain things that she knew Masson did not say.
By any definition of the term, this was 'knowing falsehood' . . ..,,..
Thus, Justice White would not require a material alteration.
Justice White argued that immaterial alterations made with knowl-
edge that the words were not said would amount to knowledge of fal-
sity.' 6 ' However, Justice White reasoned that alterations may not be
actionable if reasonable jurors could not conclude that the words
"'amounted to libel... i.e., 'expose[d Masson] to hatred, contempt, ridi-
cule, or obloquy, or ... caused him to be shunned or avoided, or... had
a tendency to injure him in his occupation.' "162 Justice White provided
the example of deliberately changing the word "mother" to "parents."
The Justice concluded that this would amount to knowledge of falsity




1. One Step Short of Protection
The majority of the United States Supreme Court took a step in the
right direction but failed to take the next step necessary to protect speak-
ers and the true meaning of quotation marks. The majority rejected the
Ninth Circuit's test of rational interpretation and substituted its own test
of material alteration. This decision still permits deliberate alterations
beyond grammar and syntax and meaningless omissions of unnecessary
words such as "really" or "very." The test that the Court should have
applied to establish actual malice is any deliberate alteration beyond syn-
157. Id. at 2432.
158. Id. at 2437.
159. Id. at 2437 (White, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2437-38.
161. Id. at 2437.
162. Id. at 2438 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982)).
163. Id.
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tax or grammar or meaningless omission. Any alteration beyond this
should be defined as material.
2. The Proper Question: Falsity vs. Defamatory?
The dissent properly analyzed the alteration of a speaker's words
placed in quotation marks as falsity under the actual malice test despite
their immateriality. According to the dissent's analysis, the inquiry is
not whether the lack of material alteration justifies falsity but whether
alteration is defamatory at all. The majority incorrectly determined that
immaterial alterations would not amount to actual malice or knowledge
of falsity. The majority should have concluded that a slight alteration
may not defame the speaker although it would amount to actual malice.
Thus, the majority focused on the wrong element of defamation in reach-
ing its conclusion.
V
Ninth Circuit's Decision On Remand
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed whether Masson's case fails as a matter of state law under
the incremental harm doctrine and whether Masson presented sufficient
evidence against The New Yorker Magazine and Alfred A. Knopf to es-
tablish that each of them acted with actual malice (the Supreme Court
having resolved this issue as to Malcolm).'
Judge Kozinski delivered the opinion for the court. First, Judge
Kozinski explained the meaning of the incremental harm doctrine, stat-
ing that the "incremental harm doctrine measures the harm 'inflicted by
the challenged statements beyond the harm imposed by the rest of the
publication. If that harm is determined to be nominal or nonexistent, the
statements are dismissed as not actionable.' "165 The court concluded
that Masson's case does not fail under the incremental harm doctrine
because the doctrine is not an element of California Law.' 6 6 The court
reasoned that the First Amendment does not require the doctrine, the
United States Supreme Court has severely undermined the authority for
the doctrine, California courts have never adopted it, and the California
Supreme Court would probably agree that the doctrine is a bad idea. 167
164. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 92 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4601, 4602 (Apr. 7,
1992).
165. Id. (citing Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 311 (2d Cir. 1986)).
166. Masson, 92 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 4602.
167. Id.
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Second, the court turned to the issue of whether the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to The New Yorker Magazine and
Knopf. The court noted:
Where the jury has proof that a publisher "actually had a high degree
of awareness of probable falsity," that alone will establish that it "in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [its] publication."
Where such direct proof is missing, the jury may nevertheless infer
that the publisher was aware of the falsity if it finds that there were
"obvious reasons to doubt" the accuracy of the story, and that the
defendant did not act reasonably in dispelling those doubts.'
68
The court concluded that Masson introduced evidence that presented a
triable issue of fact as to whether The New Yorker entertained serious
doubts as to the accuracy of the quotations. 169 However, the court found
that Knopf was entitled to rely on The New Yorker's investigation when
it republished the article and therefore was entitled to summary judg-
ment.' 70 The court remanded the case to the district court for trial.
17 1
VI
Possible Causes of Action
A party wrongfully attributed with a quotation should be permitted
to seek redress from the damage that the quotation has caused to the
party and also should be permitted to disassociate himself with the quo-
tation regardless of whether it is defamatory or not. A party may sue
under two causes of action: defamation and false light invasion of
privacy.
A. Defamation
If a party is misquoted in a defamatory manner, that party should be
permitted to sue under the tort of defamation. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts states the elements of defamation as follows:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher;
and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or
the existence of special harm caused by the publication. 1
72
168. Id. at 4603 (citing Harte.Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,
688 (1989)).
169. Masson, 92 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 4604.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
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The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution
places limitations on the recovery of general damages and requires that
public officials and public figures prove actual malice173 and that private
figures prove at least negligence in order to recover.
74
A public official and a public figure should be able to prove actual
malice by demonstrating that the party misquoting them had knowledge
that the quotation was false and published it with knowledge of falsity.
This should sufficiently satisfy the actual malice requirement of knowing
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. A party that intentionally alters
quotations knows that the new statement is false and acts with actual
malice by continuing to use quotation marks to represent that the new
statement contains the exact words of the quoted party. The media can
easily avoid this dilemma by dropping the quotation marks, thus indicat-
ing exercise of editorial license.
B. False Light Invasion of Privacy
If a party is misquoted in a manner that places him in a false light
and is offensive but not defamatory, then the party should be permitted
to sue under the tort of false light invasion of privacy. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts defines the tort of false light invasion of privacy as
follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person; and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other
would be placed.
175
Misquoting creates the potential of placing someone in a false light.
By quoting, the media reports to the public the exact words that the
source used. However, by misquoting the media may change the mean-
ing of the original quote and place the source in a false light. This action
is impermissible and harms the interests in privacy of the source.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts also defines the damages that a
party may recover for false light invasion of privacy. It states:
One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is
entitled to recover damages for
(a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion;
(b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind
that normally results from such an invasion; and
173. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
174. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
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(c) special damages of which the invasion is a legal cause. 
176
These remedies should apply to instances in which the media attributes
false quotes to individuals and places them in a false light.
C. First Amendment Right Not to be Associated With Ideas
In the event that the media materially alters a quotation in a manner
that is neither defamatory nor offensive, the party should not be without
a remedy. Under the First Amendment, a party has the right not to be
associated with ideas. In Wooley v. Maynard177 the Court held that the
state may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message by displaying the motto "Live
Free or Die" on his license plate. 7 The Court stated that "the right of
freedom of thought protected by the first amendment against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all."' 79 The Court reasoned: "A system which secures the
right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' "18o
The Constitution only protects against state action, not private ac-
tion. 8' Thus, the First Amendment does not prohibit the media from
associating a party with a quotation. However, the First Amendment
right not to be associated with ideas should apply to the media under an
analogous theory because the media has the power to associate a party
with an idea that is not his own and intrude on his right to refrain from
speaking.
Attributing quotations to a party that were not actually made asso-
ciates that party with words chosen by another as if that party said them
verbatim. Misquoted parties have not sued under this theory in the past.
This proposed theory permits misquoted parties an opportunity to disas-
sociate themselves from a quotation that they did not make regardless of
the defamatory or offensive nature of the quotation. The proposed rem-
edy would be a retraction by the media explaining that the statement in
the quotation was not the exact words of the party, and nominal dam-
ages. This theory permits wrongly attributed parties to set the record
straight and vindicate their rights.
176. Id. at 652H.
177. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
178. Id. at 713.
179. Id. at 714 (citing Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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VII
Hypothetical Instances of Misquoting
The following is a list of hypotheticals containing misquotes that
demonstrate what types of alterations are acceptable and unacceptable.
Basically, any quotation that materially alters the actual statement is un-
acceptable. If the alteration is not defamatory or offensive, it still should
be actionable, and a proposed remedy would be a retraction and nominal
damages.
A. Unacceptable Alterations of Quotations
Hypothetical 1: A reporter quotes Cher as saying, "I have the great-
est figure, I am the most beautiful woman in the world, and all of the
men, especially the younger ones, want me." Cher actually said, "I have
a great figure for my age." This alteration materially changes the quota-
tion and increases the defamatory meaning of the statement. The re-
porter had knowledge of what Cher actually said and disregarded the
truth when he invented the new quotation. Cher should succeed in an
action for defamation even though the quotation did not alter the sub-
stantive content of the actual statement and was a possible interpretation
of an ambiguous remark.
Hypothetical 2: A reporter quotes David Cassidy as saying, "My
old music was good for the 1970s, but the public's taste has improved."
David Cassidy actually said, "My music was a big hit in the 1970s; how-
ever, it does not fit in with today's music." This alteration is unaccept-
able because the reporter materially altered the quotation and put words
in David Cassidy's mouth that he did not use. The quotation probably
does not increase the defamatory nature of the statement but it is offen-
sive and places David Cassidy in a false light. The reporter acted with
actual malice because he had knowledge that the actual statement was
materially different. David Cassidy should succeed in an action for false
light invasion of privacy even if the quotation could be perceived as a
rational interpretation of an ambiguous remark and if it did not alter the
substantive content of the statement.
Hypothetical 3: A reporter quotes a staunch Republican as saying
that "Diane Feinstein would do a great job as governor of California."
The Republican actually said that "Feinstein is o.k." Although the state-
ment is not defamatory or offensive, the reporter materially altered the
quotation. The Republican should be able to disassociate himself from
the endorsement if he chooses, although the alteration could be seen as a
rational interpretation of an ambiguous remark.
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B. Acceptable Alterations of Quotations
Hypothetical 1: A reporter quotes Barbara Bush as saying, "I love
being a housewife." Mrs. Bush actually said, "I really love being a
housewife." This technical alteration is acceptable because the omission
does not amount to an invented quotation. The word "really" does not
add anything to the statement and the reporter's omission of it does not
materially alter the statement.
Hypothetical 2: A reporter quotes Dan Quayle as saying, "I believe
that Gorge Bush's decision to increase taxes was a wise decision." Dan
Quayle actually said, "I believed that George Bush's decision to increase
taxes was a wise decision." This alteration is acceptable because the re-
porter merely made a grammatical change and a typographical error that
did not change the meaning or materially alter the actual quotation.
Hypothetical 3: A reporter wrote that after finally passing the bar,
John F. Kennedy, Jr. probably screamed, "Thank God I don't have to
take the bar for a fourth time and the media will finally leave me alone."
The reporter never actually interviewed John F. Kennedy, Jr. This in-
vented quotation is acceptable because the reporter qualified the quota-




Some very well known quotations were actually altered quotations.
For example, Leo Durocher, one-time manager of the Dodgers, allegedly
said, "Nice guys finish last." The actual statement was not quite as con-
cise and catchy. A reporter asked Durocher why he could not be nicer.
Durocher pointed across to the Giants' manager, Mel Ott, and said:
"There's Mel Ott .... He's a nice guy, and he's in last place." In print it
became "Nice guys finish last," and Durocher readily adopted it. 2 This
altered quotation was not defamatory or offensive and Durocher chose to
be associated with it. Thus, in this instance the altered quotation caused
no harm.
However, in Masson, the altered quotation was defamatory and of-
fensive. Masson chose not to be associated with it. Masson is entitled to
redress, and the media must not be granted free reign in inventing
quotations.
The dictionary definition of quotations provides the basic guideline
as to what may properly be placed within quotation marks. If the major-
182. Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Wide Respect for Sanctity of the Spoken Word; Most Newspa-
pers have Strict Rules on Quotes, L.A. TIMEs, August 5, 1989, at 29.
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ity is permitted to change their definition of quotations, then the public
must be informed and must be taught to look at statements within quota-
tion marks with the same skepticism as the public looks at paraphrased
statements.

